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Abstract 
 
Housing transfer taxes are fiscally important in many countries despite evidence of substantial 
welfare losses found in several quasi-experimental studies. Research designs used in this prior 
literature are prone to attenuation bias due to spillovers from mobility or trading across control 
and treatment groups. We account for these spillovers by combining quasi-experimental 
empirical analysis with a one-sided housing market model where households act as both buyers 
and sellers. Using a Finnish tax reform and total population register data, we find that an 
increase in the transfer tax has a significant negative effect on household mobility. We calibrate 
our theoretical model to match the mobility rates in our data and our quasi-experimental 
estimate. In our setting, relying only on the quasi-experiment and ignoring the spillovers would 
lead to a 20% underestimation of the effect. We argue that the welfare costs of transfer taxes are 
larger than previously thought. 
JEL-Codes: H210, R210, R230. 
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1 Introduction
Housing transfer taxes are typically seen as an inefficient form of taxation, but are nonethe-
less fiscally important in many countries (e.g. Mirrlees et al. 2011 and Andrews et al.
2011). The transfer tax drives a wedge between the cost of buying a house and the price
received by the seller and thereby reduces the likelihood of mutually beneficial transac-
tions. As a result, housing units are more likely to be owned by those who do not value
them the most. In countries where most households own their home, such as the UK and
the US, transfer taxes may also affect household mobility as moving requires selling and
buying a house. Through their effects on mobility, transfer taxes may influence not only
the allocation of housing units to households, but also the allocation of jobs to employees.
We study the effects of the housing transfer tax on household mobility in Finland,
a country with a high homeownership rate, using high-quality register data on the total
population from 2005–2016. We exploit variation from a tax reform implemented in
March 2013, which raised the transfer tax rate of housing co-operatives (henceforth co-
ops) without affecting the tax rate of directly-owned single-family detached houses. This
quasi-experimental setting can be analyzed using a differences-in-differences (DID) design
where the treatment group consists of homeowners living in housing units subject to the
tax increase and the control group of homeowners whose housing units were unaffected
by the reform.
However, in a housing market setting this type of design may be flawed due to spillover
effects between the treatment and control groups. For example, if homeowners in the
treatment group move less because of the tax increase, the homeowners in the control
group may also be indirectly affected as they now effectively have less trading partners to
interact with.
To analyze this issue further, we complement our empirical analysis with a theoretical
model of a housing market where all households are homeowners and act as both buyers
and sellers. We calibrate the model to replicate our DID estimate as well as the mobility
rates between and within the housing market segments in our micro data. This enables
us to take into account household mobility across different housing market segments and
assess the potential bias in our DID estimate.
Our main finding is that the transfer tax has a significant negative impact on mobil-
ity. Combining the empirical and theoretical analyses and taking into account spillovers
between housing market segments, we find a roughly 7% reduction in household mobil-
ity due to a 0.5 percentage point increase in the transfer tax rate. Our empirical DID
estimate of the effect is roughly 5.6%, suggesting a 20% bias in the estimate. Ignoring
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the spillovers would lead to a substantial underestimation of the negative effects of the
transfer tax.
Prior empirical literature relies heavily on similar comparisons of treatment and control
groups consisting of different segments of the same housing market. A number of papers
use price notches in the tax schedule for identification. Besley et al. (2014), Hilber and
Lyytika¨inen (2017) and Best and Kleven (2018) study the effects of the UK Stamp Duty
Land Tax using price notches in the tax schedule. Kopczuk and Munroe (2015) utilize the
discontinuity in tax liability induced by the so-called mansion tax applied in the states
of New York and New Jersey where the tax rate is 1% on residential transactions of $1
million or more, but transactions at prices below $1 million are not subject to the tax.
Slemrod et al. (2017) study a series of transfer tax reforms introducing discontinuous
jumps in tax liability in Washington DC.
Dachis et al. (2012) and Fritzsche and Vandrei (2019) exploit both spatial and temporal
variation in transfer taxes. Dachis et al. (2012) analyze the introduction of the Land
Transfer Tax in the city of Toronto. The reform set a 1.1% tax rate on transactions in the
city of Toronto, but no tax on other parts of the Greater Toronto housing market area,
thus dividing the market into treatment and control groups. Fritzsche and Vandrei (2019)
exploit state level variation in the transfer tax rate in Germany where state governments
have been able to set their own tax rates since September 2006.
All papers with the exception of Slemrod et al. (2017) find that the transfer tax has
a substantial negative effect on the number transactions or moves.1 However, comparing
transactions of houses just below and above a tax notch or within and outside a geographic
area consistently identifies a causal effect only if there is no trading across the tax notch or
across regions. Our results suggest that these empirical strategies may lead to substantial
underestimation of adverse effects of transfer taxes.
In addition to the overall effects, our rich register data with detailed information on the
characteristics of households and their housing units allows us to obtain a more complete
picture of the effects of the tax reform in the labor and housing markets. First, we analyze
labor market related outcomes as transaction costs in the housing market may influence
labor mobility (e.g., Munch et al. 2006, Battu et al. 2008 and Yang 2019). We find that
household mobility decreased mainly within labor market areas, although we also detect
a negative effect on moves across municipal boundaries, suggesting that we cannot rule
out labor market effects. At the same time, we do not find effects on direct labor market
1Ma¨a¨tta¨nen and Tervio¨ (2019) examine the welfare effects of transaction taxes using a one-sided
assignment model. Their estimates of the welfare loss are broadly in line with the estimates of this prior
empirical literature.
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outcomes, such as job changes or employment status.
Second, we analyze more closely the different margins of housing consumption ad-
justments highlighted in the literature on housing consumption over the life-cycle (e.g.
Ortalo-Magne´ and Rady 2006, Flavin and Nakagawa 2008, Attanasio et al. 2012 and Li
et al. 2016). We find that the tax increase affected most strongly moves involving small
housing unit size adjustments. We also find that these effects are asymmetric. Upsizing
became less frequent, but there were no effects on downsizing.
This asymmetry is in line with a life-cycle model where credit-constrained households
gradually climb the housing ladder by making small upgrades in unit size with multiple
moves and downsize maybe only once towards the end of the life-cycle (e.g. Ortalo-Magne´
and Rady 2006 and Attanasio et al. 2012). When transaction costs increase, upsizing takes
place through fewer moves over the life-cycle, but downsizing may be unaffected.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the Finnish transfer
tax and the reform that we exploit in the analysis. In section 3, we present the data and
the research design. Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 offers discussion
and conclusions.
2 Institutional Setting and Reform
In Finland, home ownership can be attained either by directly owning a single-family
detached house (henceforth directly owned house) or through a housing co-op. Typically,
housing co-ops are limited-liability companies that own residential buildings and often
the lots under the buildings. Owning housing co-op shares corresponding to a certain
apartment in practice implies owning the apartment.2 For instance, the owner may ren-
ovate the apartment and the shares can be sold or the apartment rented out without the
consent of the other shareholders. Housing co-ops often have outstanding loans obtained
during the construction of the building or at some later stage for renovation. When buy-
ing shares for a particular apartment, the buyer becomes responsible for any co-op loans
linked to the shares. All multi-unit residential buildings are co-ops. The ownership of a
single-family detached house can also be organized as a co-op, although this is rare. In
this case, the co-op usually includes several houses.
The transfer tax is paid by the buyer and the buyer officially becomes a shareholder of
the co-op or the owner of the house only after the transfer tax has been paid. First-time
buyers under the age of 40 are exempt from paying the tax.
2In this respect the Finnish housing co-op’s have similarities with condominiums in the U.S.
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We exploit a tax reform that increased the transfer tax burden of co-op apartments,
while the tax treatment of directly-owned houses remained unchanged. Until the end of
February 2013, the transfer tax rate for was 4% for directly-owned houses and 1.6% for
for co-op apartments. In both cases, the tax base was the transaction price. On March
1, 2013 the transfer tax rate for co-ops was raised from 1.6% to 2% and the tax base was
broadened to include the housing co-op loan linked to the apartment. For example, for
an apartment with a transaction price of 200,000 euros and an outstanding co-op loan of
20,000 euros, the transfer tax liability was 3,200 euros (1.6%×200, 000) before the reform.
After the reform, the tax liability increased to 4,400 euros (2% × (200, 000 + 20, 000)).
Personal mortgages do not affect the transfer tax.
The main aim of the reform was to increase tax revenue and to bring the tax treat-
ment of co-ops and directly-owned houses closer together. According to the government
proposal, the size of co-op loans had been increasing before the reform, especially in newly
built housing, effectively eroding the tax base. The situation was considered undesirable
as the tax burden of a given transaction depended on how the construction of the build-
ing was financed. Moreover, the co-op loans were often substantially lower in the case of
resales.
According to the government proposal, the reform was expected to increase annual tax
revenue by roughly 80 million euros, from the 580 million euros (0.3% of GDP) collected
in 2012. Slightly more than 50% of this increase was expected to result from the tax rate
increase and the rest from the broadening of the tax base.
The reform was initially announced in the beginning of October 2012 and was supposed
to become effective on January 1, 2013. However, in December 5, 2012 it was announced
that the reform would be postponed to March 1, 2013. The delay was due to technical
issues in the tax administration.
3 Data and Research Design
3.1 Data
Our data come from Statistics Finland and include the entire Finnish population from
2005 to 2016. The data contain extensive register information about households, including
households’ residence at the end of each year and whether the household is a renter or a
homeowner and whether the unit is a directly-owned house or a co-op apartment.
Our measure of moving is based on the location and the characteristics of the housing
unit. Under our definition, a household moved if at least one of the following changed
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between the end of year t− 1 and t: (i) postcode, (ii) type of housing unit (owned co-op
apartment, directly-owned house and rented unit), (iii) number of rooms. This definition
means that we are going to miss some very short-distance moves within the postcode area,
where the number of rooms and the type of unit did not change.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the homeowner households in our data. The
first two columns include homeowners in houses (our control group) and the next two
columns include homeowners in co-ops (our treatment group). The homeowners in co-ops
are somewhat different from households living in directly-owned houses. For example,
they are more likely to be single and to live in urban areas. Homeowners living in co-ops
are also more mobile than homeowners living in directly-owned houses (average annual
mobility rates over the time period are 7.2% and 3.8%, respectively).
Table 1: Summary statistics for homeowner households, 2005− 2016.
Directly-owned house Co-op
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Moved (t-1,t) 0.038 0.192 0.072 0.259
Male hh head 0.858 0.349 0.642 0.480
Taxable income 31,358 21,132 32,885 21,673
Age 56.1 15.4 56.2 17.7
Single 0.228 0.419 0.475 0.499
Number of kids 0.817 1.133 0.362 0.750
Upper secondary education 0.197 0.398 0.355 0.478
Employed 0.578 0.494 0.544 0.498
Unemployed 0.056 0.231 0.047 0.213
Pensioner 0.350 0.477 0.390 0.488
Urban municipality 0.475 0.499 0.843 0.363
Semi-urban municipality 0.241 0.428 0.099 0.299
Rural municipality 0.281 0.450 0.056 0.230
Observations 9,791,352 8,074,113
Observations 2012 899,745 743,355
Notes: Taxable income, age, education level and labor market status refer to the head of the household.
In Table 2, we decompose the annual mobility rates according to destination of the
move. The table shows the probability of moving for households in different types of
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housing units and the destination of the move (pooled data for years 2005-2016). For
comparison, the table also reports the mobility rates for renters.
Conditional on moving, homeowners living in co-ops are most likely to buy into another
co-op (2.9%). Similarly, renters are most likely to move to another rental unit (13.0%).
In the case of homeowners living in a directly-owned house the differences are smaller. It
seems fair to say that homeowners in co-ops predominantly trade with other co-op owners.
However, there are also spillovers from one market segment to the other.
Table 2: Mobility rates by origin and destination housing type.
Move to
Current unit House Co-op Rental
House 0.013 0.010 0.016
Co-op 0.017 0.029 0.021
Rental 0.028 0.034 0.130
Notes: Annual mobility rates from directly-owned house, owned co-op apartment and rental unit to
directly-owned house, owned co-op apartment and rental unit (pooled data for years 2005− 2016).
3.2 Research Design
A market transaction occurs when it benefits both the buyer and the seller. The housing
transfer tax drives a wedge between the cost of buying a unit and the price received by the
seller of the unit. The tax therefore reduces the likelihood that the buyer and the seller
are able to settle on a mutually beneficial transaction price. As a result, the transaction
volume is smaller than in the absence of the transfer tax and the housing units are more
likely to be owned by those who do not value them the most. This basic mechanism is
well understood and extensively discussed in the literature (e.g. Mirrlees et al. 2011).
In a housing market with a high homeownership rate, transactions are closely con-
nected to mobility as moving often requires selling and buying a house. Therefore, the
transfer tax is expected to reduce household mobility and lead to households living in
housing units that are less suitable for them in terms of location or other characteristics.
In order to study the magnitude of these effects, ideally, we would compare the mobility
of households after a transfer tax increase to the mobility of these same households in
a situation where the transfer tax was not raised. Obviously, we never observe both
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outcomes for the same households and we need to impute a credible counterfactual that
serves as the baseline when estimating the causal effect of the transfer tax increase.
To this end, we exploit the Finnish transfer tax reform where the tax was increased
for shares in co-ops. Since the tax was increased in transactions involving co-ops, we
expect mutually beneficial trading opportunities to diminish. This would translate into
lower mobility among homeowners living in co-ops, which is our treatment group. As
the tax for directly-owned houses was not increased, we can construct the counterfactual
using homeowners living in directly-owned houses as a control group. Having data for the
treatment and control groups before and after the tax increase facilitates the use of DID
methods.
Our DID model takes the form
movei,t = α + δ1coopi,t−1 + δ2afteri,t + δ3coopi,t−1 × afteri,t + β′Xi,t−1 + ui,t, (1)
where move is equal to one if the household moved between the end of year t − 1 and
t and zero otherwise. The dummy variable coop indicates the treatment group, which
consists of homeowners who lived in a co-op at the end of year t− 1. The control group
consists of homeowners who lived in a directly-owned house at the end of year t − 1.
Dummy variable after indicates the time period after the tax increase. Vector X denotes
the control variables, which include household characteristics (see Table 1) and postcode
fixed effects.
The parameter for the interaction term, δ3, has a causal interpretation under two
assumptions. The first is the common trends assumption, which means that in the absence
of the treatment the mobility of homeowners living in co-ops and directly-owned houses
would have developed similarly. This assumption can be tested indirectly by analyzing
the pre-treatment trends in mobility in the treatment and control groups.
The second assumption is that there are no spillovers across the treatment and control
groups. That is, the mobility of households in the control group is not affected by the
mobility decisions of the households in the treatment group.
This assumption fails if the two housing market segments are connected. This can
be illustrated with a simple example. Assume that the transfer tax is fully capitalized
into prices. If the tax rate on co-ops is increased, homeowners living in co-ops would
receive a lower price for their current unit than before the tax increase. On the other
hand, they would face the same tax inclusive price as before when buying a new co-op
apartment. This makes a move to another co-op less appealing for them. If the mobility
of homeowners living in co-ops is reduced, there are fewer co-ops in the market, which in
turn may influence all households contemplating moving to a co-op.
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These spillovers are likely if co-ops and houses are close substitutes linking the two
market segments. According to Table 2 we cannot rule out such spillovers. If the tax
increase also reduces mobility among the control group of homeowners in directly owned
houses, our estimates will be biased towards zero. After presenting our baseline DID
results, we use a theoretical model, calibrated to replicate the mobility rates in our data,
to assess the magnitude of the potential bias in our estimates.
In addition to the group assignment, we need to discuss two issues related to the timing
of the treatment. Our household data are at annual level and the place of residence is
recorded at the last day of the year. The tax increase in turn was announced in October
2012 and eventually took place in March 2013.
The first issue concerns households who moved in January or February 2013. These
households moved before the tax increase, but in our baseline specification the moves
are miss-classified as having taken place after the reform. This will bias our estimates
towards zero if the tax increase reduced mobility after March 2013. The second concern
is that households planning to move may have brought their transaction forward in order
to benefit from the lower pre-reform tax rate. This anticipation effect might have induced
them also to move before the end of 2012. In our baseline specification, this anticipation
response would bias our estimates away from zero. We address these issues by reporting
a number of robustness checks.
The nature of the policy reform has important implications for statistical inference.
Although the data covers the entire population there are actually only two relevant groups
(co-op owners and direct owners) which we compare in different years. First, failing to take
into account the unobserved group-year effects would produce downward biased standard
errors, but standard clustering methods are not feasible with only two groups and eleven
years. Second, Donald and Lang (2007) argue that, when the number of groups is small
in a DID setting, applying standard asymptotics implies that the significance of the t-
statistics is overstated. In order to address these issues, we use the two-step procedure
proposed by Donald and Lang (2007), which effectively treats the number of group-years
as the number of observations.
Instead of estimating equation (1) directly, we first use the household-level data to
estimate yearly group-specific intercepts, cg,t, from the following model:
movei,t = cg,t + β
′Xi,t−1 + vi,t, (2)
where g ∈ {coop, house}.
In the second step, we use the annual group-level data with 22 observations of cg,t to
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estimate the DID model:
cg,t = αt + δ1coopg,t−1 + δ3coopg,t−1 × afterg,t + ug,t. (3)
This regression gives the same point estimates as the OLS regression using micro data,
but corrects standard errors for correlation within housing type year cells, and uses the
t-distribution with only 9 degrees of freedom.3 We use year fixed effects αt as additional
controls so that the main effect of afterg,t is absorbed by them.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline mobility effects
We start by presenting graphical evidence on the mobility rate of homeowners in the
treatment and control groups. This allows us to visually assess the plausibility of the
common trends assumption and the size of the possible treatment effect. The left panel
in Figure 1 presents the group-specific mobility rates, whereas in the right panel the
mobility rates are normalized to one in 2012 just before the tax increase.
3Donald and Lang (2007) propose weighting the second step regression by the standard errors of the
cg,t to gain precision. In our data, weighting has no practical importance because the standard errors
are almost identical. We therefore report the unweighted estimates. The time series nature of the data
raises the additional issue of serial correlation of the error terms (Bertrand et al. 2004) but this is a minor
concern in our setting after controlling for common year effects.
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Figure 1: Mobility rate for homeowners in co-ops (treatment) and in directly owned houses
(control).
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Notes: The left panel presents the group-specific mobility rates. In the right panel, the mobility rates
are normalized to one in 2012. Mobility rate refers to the share of homeowners who move between the
end of year t–1 and the end of year t. Group assignment is based on the homeowners’ housing type in
year t–1. The vertical line indicates the timing of the reform.
Three observations stand out from Figure 1. First, the mobility rate is clearly higher
in the treatment group than in the control group throughout the time period (left panel).
This is true even after controlling for household characteristics and adding postcode fixed
effects. Second, the trends in mobility rates are similar in the treatment and control
groups in the pre-treatment period. There seem to be some differences in the develop-
ment during the financial crises, but the groups develop very similarly during the last
four pre-treatment years. This is especially clear after normalization, when we compare
proportionate changes in the mobility rate relative to 2012 (right panel). Formal pre-
treatment placebo tests also point to pre-treatment common trends (see Figures A1 and
A2 in Appendix A.) Finally, after the tax increase, the mobility rate decreases in both
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groups, but clearly more so in the treatment group. This divergence is also permanent.
Table 3 presents the DID regression results corresponding to Figure 1 using the two-
step procedure of Donald and Lang (2007). In the first column, the first-stage regression
does not include any additional control variables. In the second column, we add the
household-level control variables shown in Table 1. In the third column, we further add
postcode fixed effects. All model specifications include year dummies in the second step.
Panel A reports the results for a specification where the dependent variable is the mobility
rate and Panel B for a specification where the dependent variable is the log of mobility
rate.
Table 3: DID results for mobility.
Panel A (1) (2) (3)
Mobility rate Mobility rate Mobility rate
Coop 0.0358∗∗∗ 0.0247∗∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗
(0.000583) (0.000630) (0.000631)
Coop × After -0.00503∗∗∗ -0.00401∗∗∗ -0.00399∗∗∗
(0.000967) (0.00104) (0.00105)
Pre mean 0.0749 0.0749 0.0749
Panel B
Log mobility rate Log mobility rate Log mobility rate
Coop 0.651∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗
(0.00864) (0.00739) (0.00749)
Coop × After -0.0506∗∗∗ -0.0560∗∗∗ -0.0562∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0123) (0.0124)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
HH characteristics No Yes Yes
Postcode FE No No Yes
Notes: Table shows DID estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step procedure. Sample size of
the micro data used in the first step is approximately 18M. Sample size of the housing type-year data used
in the second step is 22. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance is based on t(9)-distribution
and is denoted by asterisks: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The control variables include year fixed
effects, household characteristics reported in Table 1 and postcode fixed effects (in t–1).
The regression results are in line with Figure 1 and robust across specifications. The
reduction in the mobility rate in the treatment group is roughly 0.40 percentage points.
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Compared to the pre-treatment mobility rate, this implies that the mobility rate decreased
by 5.6%. This translates to roughly 3,000 fewer moves per year (−0.0040× 743, 335).
From the table it is also clear that more mobile households tend to sort into co-ops.
The main effect of Coop in Panel A diminishes from approximately 3.6% to 2% when
we include household characteristics and postcode fixed effects as controls in the first
stage. Interestingly, using the treatment effect estimate of 0.4%-points and extrapolating
to a hypothetical reform that would eliminate the remaining 2%-point tax rate differ-
ence between co-ops and directly owned houses suggests that almost all of the remaining
difference in mobility rates can be explained by the tax rate difference.
4.2 Additional robustness and validity checks
In addition to the pre-treatment placebo test, we have conducted a number of robustness
and validity checks. First, we test the robustness of the results with respect to anticipation
effects. As discussed in Section 3, moves that were planned to take place in 2013 may
have been brought forward to the end of 2012 because of the anticipated tax increase. As
our measure of moving is based on the situation at the end of each year, this anticipation
effect would show up in our data as excessive moves in 2012 and fewer moves in 2013,
leading our DID estimates to be biased away from zero.
Figure A3 in Appendix A reports the monthly transaction volume of co-op apart-
ments from January 2010 to December 2017. As the figure shows, the reform was clearly
anticipated: the transaction volume in February 2013 is unusually high. However, the
announcement of the reform did not lead to anticipation at the end of 2012. Based on
Figure A3 it seems that anticipation is not a serious concern in our setting.4 Nonetheless,
in order to check the robustness of our results to these timing issues, we estimate speci-
fications where we omit years 2012 and 2013. The results are reported in Table A1 and
Table A2 and they show that the results are not affected by this omission.
Table A1 and Table A2 also report our main estimation for different time windows.
One may argue that observations at the beginning of the time period may not provide as
good a point of comparison for the post-reform years as observations closer to the reform.
Therefore, we vary the width of the time window around the reform from 2007–2016 to
2009–2016. In addition, we allow for differential group-specific linear time trends. Overall,
the results are robust to these changes in the specification. The point estimates are very
close to those reported in Table 3, but in some cases the statistical significance is weaker
4Figure A3 also shows that there is a permanent downward shift in transaction volume after the tax
increase supporting our main findings with respect to household mobility.
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due to fewer degrees of freedom.
Finally, increased moving costs in the co-op segment may lead to sorting so that
households who are inherently less mobile are more likely to occupy a co-op apartment
after the tax increase. We have analyzed the mobility rates in the control and treatment
groups based on how observable household characteristics predict mobility. Figure A4
and Table A3 indicate that, after the reform, co-op homeowner group indeed becomes less
mobile in terms of observable characteristics that predict mobility. However, the sorting
is very gradual and small in magnitude and cannot therefore explain the immediate and
large decrease in mobility after to the tax increase. Nonetheless, this is consistent with
our overall message that transfer taxes affect household behavior.
4.3 Accounting for spillovers
Our empirical analysis assumes that the mobility rates of homeowners living in directly-
owned houses are not affected by the reform and therefore these homeowners constitute a
reliable control group for the analysis. This approach is quite standard in the literature as
several studies also exploit similar reforms which increase the transaction tax for certain
types of houses without affecting the tax rate for other houses (e.g. Dachis et al. 2012
and Best and Kleven 2018).
As we discussed in Section 3, it is unlikely that these different market segments are
entirely independent from each other. In order to analyze the role of the linkages between
the different market segments, we build a theoretical model with owner-occupied housing
and two different housing types in two different locations (say, different neighborhoods
or cities). The housing types are different in terms of some characteristics which make
them less than perfect substitutes (say, having a yard or not), and they are also subject
to different transfer tax rates. In the model, each household has a preference for one
housing type and one location but may face a preference shock which makes the current
unit less suitable for it. Given the preferences, the costs related to moving to another
housing type and location and the fixed distribution of housing stock, we solve for a
competitive equilibrium, i.e. house prices such that the excess demand for all housing
types and locations is equal to zero.
We use the model to analyze the effects of changing the tax treatment of one housing
type without changing that of the other type, thus mimicking the actual Finnish tax
reform. The aim is to uncover the mobility patterns between different housing types
before and after the tax reform and thereby understand how and to what extent our
control group is affected by the reform.
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In order to be useful, the model needs to reproduce the empirical mobility patterns
between and within the different market segments before the reform. This is important as
the bias in our DID estimate presumably depends on how strong the linkages between the
two market segments are. In addition, the model needs to reproduce our DID estimate as
an outcome to a reform which increases the tax rate on co-ops by 0.5 percentage points.
This is important in order to pin down the house prices in the model.
We calibrate the model so that it exactly replicates the empirical mobility patterns
between different market segments in our data before the reform and produces our DID
estimate of a 5.6% reduction in mobility when we increase the tax rate for co-ops in the
model from 1.5% to 2.0%.5
In the model, the reform affects not only moves between co-ops but also moves from
co-ops to houses and vice versa. The main reason is that after the reform homeowners
living in co-ops are less likely to find welfare improving trades. As a result the effective
supply of co-ops is reduced from the point of view of homeowners living in houses and
contemplating moving to co-ops.
Overall, the reform reduces the mobility rate of homeowners living in co-ops by 7.0%
in the model. As the model reproduces our DID estimate of 5.6%, this means that the
DID estimate is biased downwards by 1.4 percentage points. The bias arises from the fact
that also the homeowners in the control group are indirectly affected by the reform. The
use of the DID estimate only in assessing the effects of the reform, would underestimate
the negative effects of the reform on the mobility of homeowners living in co-ops by some
20%.
The size of the welfare loss related to these forgone moves can be illustrated by cal-
culating the marginal cost of public funds (MCF ), which relates the welfare loss of a
tax increase to the additional tax revenue raised. For a non-distortionary tax, the MCF
is equal to one and the larger the welfare cost related to the tax, the larger the MCF.
According to our calculations presented in more detail in Appendix C, the MCF for this
tax reform ranges from 1.31 to 1.41.
4.4 Effects on different types of moves
We next turn to studying different types of moves and labor market outcomes. By affect-
ing household mobility, the transfer tax may influence the allocation of jobs to employees.6
5The technical details of the analysis are presented in Appendix B.
6In this respect, our study is related to the literature studying the relationship between home owner-
ship, which involves higher moving costs compared to renting, and unemployment. See e.g., Munch et al.
(2006), Battu et al. (2008) and Yang (2019).
14
In analyzing whether the transfer tax hinders labor market matching, we use two comple-
mentary strategies. First, we try to differentiate between moves within and across labor
markets, and second, we look at labor market outcomes directly.
Since we do not directly observe which moves are related to labor markets, we consider
two alternative definitions for a labor market move based on different administrative
regional divisions: provinces (n = 19) and municipalities (n = 320). Provinces are quite
large geographic areas (level 3 in NUTS classification) and commuting across province
borders is rare. Most people live and work in the same municipality, but commuting
across municipal borders is much more common than across province borders.
Using these geographic divisions, moves that take place across regional boundaries
(province or municipality) are assumed to be labor market moves while moves within
regional boundaries are assumed to be motivated by housing consumption adjustment.
Because provinces are large geographically, we are likely to miss-classify some labor market
moves as housing consumption moves, i.e., some moves that take place within a province
may actually be labor market moves. With the municipality division, the potential miss-
classification runs in the other direction. Some moves that take place across municipal
borders may be housing consumption adjustments but are miss-classified as labor market
moves.
With these caveats in mind, Figure 2 and Table 4 show the results using these two
definitions for a sample excluding pensioners. The results are not conclusive on the effects
of transfer tax on labor market moves. Moves across provinces do not seem to be affected
by the tax increase. Our overall results are driven by reduced mobility within provinces.
On the other hand, the effect of the tax increase is quite similar for moves between and
within municipalities. To the extent that moves across municipal borders include labor
market moves, this would indicate that the transfer tax has some labor market effects.
However, we cannot be sure whether this is the case.
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Figure 2: Mobility between and within provinces and municipalities.
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Notes: Mobility rate refers to the share of homeowners in each group who move between the end of year
t–1 and the end of year t. The mobility rates are normalized to one in 2012. Group assignment is based
on the homeowners’ housing type in year t–1. The vertical line indicates the timing of the reform.
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Table 4: DID results for mobility between and within provinces and municipalities.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Move across
provinces
Move within
provinces
Move across
municipalities
Move within
municipality
Panel A: Mobility rate
Co-op × After -0.000221 -0.00520∗∗∗ -0.00266∗∗∗ -0.00297∗∗
(0.000180) (0.00153) (0.000434) (0.00123)
Pre mean 0.0102 0.0647 0.0271 0.0474
Panel B: Log mobility rate
Co-op × After -0.0221 -0.0857∗∗∗ -0.0983∗∗∗ -0.0848∗∗∗
(0.0156) (0.00218) (0.0159) (0.0194)
Notes: Table shows DID estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step procedure. Sample size of
the micro data used in the first step is approximately 11M. Sample size of the housing type-year data used
in the second step is 22. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance is based on t(9)-distribution
and is denoted by asterisks: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The control variables include year fixed
effects, household characteristics reported in Table 1 and postcode fixed effects (in t–1).
As a complementary strategy we look at labor market outcomes directly. We ana-
lyze the probability of changing job and becoming employed directly and conditional on
moving. Figure 3 and Table 5 report the results. The left panel in Figure 3 shows the
probability of changing the job (upper panel) or becoming employed (lower panel) in the
treatment and control group. The right panel shows the probability of both changing job
and moving to a different housing unit (upper panel) and the probability of becoming
employed and moving to a different housing unit (lower panel). In all cases, the proba-
bilities are reported relative to 2012. Based on the figure, there are no notable effects on
these outcomes. This is confirmed by the corresponding DID regression results in Table
5. On the other hand, standard errors are quite large and we can not rule out important
effects relative to the size of the treatment.
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Figure 3: Labor market outcomes.
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t–1 and the end of year t. The mobility rates are normalized to one in 2012. Group assignment is based
on the homeowners’ housing type in year t–1. The vertical line indicates the timing of the reform.
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Table 5: DID results for labor market outcomes.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change job
Move and
change job Become employed
Move and become
employed
Panel A: Levels
Co-op × After 0.00168 -0.00198 -0.00384 0.000684
(0.00536) (0.00114) (0.00451) (0.00142)
Pre mean 0.130 0.0204 0.219 0.0267
Panel B: Logs
Co-op × After 0.00367 -0.101∗ -0.0147 0.0685
(0.0403) (0.0508) (0.0227) (0.0508)
Notes: Table shows DID estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step procedure. Sample size of
the micro data used in the first step is approximately 8M in columns (1) and (2) and 900,000 in columns
(3) and (4). Sample size of the housing type-year data used in the second step is 20 in columns (1)
and (2) and 22 in columns (3) and (4). Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance is based on
t(9)-distribution and is denoted by asterisks: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The control variables
include year fixed effects, household characteristics reported in Table 1 and postcode fixed effects (in t–1).
The second important margin potentially affected by transfer taxes is the adjustment
of housing consumption, especially from a life-cycle perspective. Several issues are inter-
esting in this regard.7 First, by increasing the cost of housing consumption adjustments,
transfer taxes may make adjustments less frequent and thereby influence the housing lad-
der, i.e. the idea that in different stages of their life-cycle homeowners will own different
sized homes (e.g., Ortalo-Magne´ and Rady 2006, Attanasio et al. 2012 and Bajari et al.
2013). Second, by creating an ”inaction region” over which households do not adjust their
stock of housing in response to income shocks, for example, transaction costs may create
additional volatility in non-durable consumption and influence the desire for building liq-
uid asset buffers to smooth consumption (e.g., Grossman and Laroque 1990, Flavin and
Nakagawa 2008 and Yang 2009).
In order to understand these effects, we divide moves into different margins of housing
consumption adjustments. We first analyze the size of the adjustment in terms of number
of rooms. This is of interest because one could expect that moves involving a small
adjustment of housing consumption are more strongly affected by changes in transaction
7See Piazzesi and Schneider (2016) for a survey on studies analyzing the life-cycle aspects and impli-
cations of housing consumption and homeownership.
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costs than larger adjustments. Large adjustments may even become more common if
households take fewer, but larger steps when climbing the housing ladder.
We also divide the moves into upsizing and downsizing. Prior literature has identified
credit-constraints as an important reason why young households move up the housing
ladder gradually with several moves, whereas downsizing usually happens later in life
with fewer or just a single large size adjustment. If small adjustments are more likely to
be affected by the increase in the transfer tax rate, we should observe a larger impact
on upsizing compared to downsizing. Upsizing and downsizing might also be driven by
different kinds of shocks to housing demand. For example, downsizing could be more often
related to ”forced moves”, due to unemployment, divorce or illness, where tax incentives
may play a limited role.8
The results are shown in Figure 4 and Table 6. The moves are divided into those where
the number of rooms stays the same, changes by one and changes by two rooms or more.
In addition, moves are divided to upsizing and downsizing. As Figure 4 shows, in general,
the trends in mobility rates are quite similar in the treatment and control groups in the
pre-treatment period. However, when looking at downsizing there are some differences in
the development right after the financial crisis.
According to columns 1–3 of Table 6, the tax reduces moves to same size housing unit
by about 8%, moves to units with one room more or less by 5%, and other moves by
4%. Columns 4 and 5 in Table 6 show that this result follows from a clear reduction
in upsizing. Downsizing seems to be unaffected by the tax increase, which is consistent
with these moves being larger or being driven by ”forced moves” where tax incentives are
relatively unimportant.
The asymmetry might also be at least partly explained by the spillovers between the
different housing market segments discussed above. In our control group, those upsizing
are more likely to move to another house than to a co-op whereas those downsizing
are more likely to move to a co-op than to another house.9 As a result, in the control
group, those upsizing are probably unaffected by the reform as they move from house to
house. Those downsizing, in turn, may be indirectly affected by the reform due to reduced
mobility of homeowners living in co-ops. If so, our DID estimates related to downsizing
may be biased towards zero.
8Fischer and Khorunzhina (2019) analyze how homeownership and housing demand is influenced by
divorce risk.
9This pattern is probably mostly explained by differences in the size distributions: Directly-owned
houses are often quite large while co-op apartments also include studios or two-room apartments. For
details on the mobility patterns, see Table A4 in Appendix A.
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Figure 4: Housing size adjustment.
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one in 2012. Group assignment is based on the homeowners’ housing type in year t–1. The vertical line
indicates the timing of the reform.
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Table 6: DID results for housing size adjustment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Same size 1 br change
2 or more
br change Upsize Downsize
Panel A: Mobility rate
Co-op × After -0.00123∗∗∗ -0.00179∗∗ -0.000976∗∗ -0.00302∗∗∗ 0.000250
(0.000335) (0.000628) (0.000346) (0.000688) (0.000254)
Pre mean 0.0180 0.0338 0.0231 0.0368 0.0201
Panel B: Log mobility rate
Co-op × After -0.0788∗∗∗ -0.0501∗∗∗ -0.0407∗∗ -0.0566∗∗∗ 0.0284
(0.0120) (0.0144) (0.0139) (0.0165) (0.0156)
Notes: Table shows DID estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step procedure. Sample size of
the micro data used in the first step is approximately 18M. Sample size of the housing type-year data used
in the second step is 22. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance is based on t(9)-distribution and
is denoted by asterisks: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All models include household characteristics
reported in Table 1 and postcode fixed effects in the first step and the co-op main effect and year dummies
in the second step.
5 Conclusions
We studied the effects of the housing transfer tax on household mobility using Finnish reg-
ister data and quasi-experimental variation arising from a recent tax reform. Combining
our quasi-experiment with a theoretical model of a housing market consisting of home-
owner households, we showed that the transfer tax has a significant negative impact on
mobility. We also highlighted that the quasi-experimental empirical approaches prevalent
in the literature of using control and treatment groups from the same housing market can
lead to substantial underestimation of the adverse effects of transfer taxes. This should
be of interest to policy-makers as housing transfer taxes continue to be fiscally important
in many countries.
In addition to overall effects and the role of spillovers across market segments, we ana-
lyzed the effects of the tax reform in more detail. First, mobility decreased mainly within
labor markets. Second, we did not find clear effects on job changes or on employment
status. Although the DID results are probably biased toward zero also in these cases, we
can rule out large labor market effects from this tax reform. This result is in line with
UK evidence reported in Hilber and Lyytika¨inen (2017), but naturally, we cannot rule out
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labor market effects from larger tax changes. Third, the tax reform affected more strongly
moves with small housing unit size adjustment and had a stronger effect on upsizing than
on downsizing.
This asymmetry suggests that transfer taxes may distort the life-cycle profile of housing
consumption and thereby savings and portfolio choices and magnify the effects of income
and house price risk. Analyzing the effects of transfer taxes on the housing choices over
the life-cycle should prove as a fruitful avenue for further research.
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Appendix
A Robustness and Validity Checks
In this Appendix, we report the results for the robustness and validity checks discussed in
the main text. First, Figures A1 and A2 present placebo treatments for years 2007−2016.
In Figure A1 the outcome variable is the mobility rate corresponding to Panel A of Table
3. In Figure A2 the outcome variable is the log of mobility rate corresponding to Panel
B of Table 3. The placebo treatment effects come from a model that uses data for
the whole period, and adds the placebo reform in our baseline model (in addition to
the actual reform). The figures also report our baseline treatment effect. None of the
placebo treatments are statistically significant before or after the actual reform. The
latter reinforces the fact that the reform had lasting effects on the mobility rate.
Figure A1: Placebo reforms (Outcome: Mobility rate).
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Notes: Placebo DID estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step procedure. All models include
household characteristics and postcode fixed effects in the first step and the co-op main effect, the
interaction term for the actual reform, and year dummies in the second step. Placebo reforms are
included in the model one by one to in addition to the actual reform.
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Figure A2: Placebo reforms (Outcome: Log mobility rate).
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Notes: Placebo DID estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step procedure. All models include
household characteristics and postcode fixed effects in the first step and the co-op main effect, the
interaction term for the actual reform, and year dummies in the second step. Placebo reforms are
included in the model one by one to in addition to the actual reform.
Second, our household data are at an annual level and the place of residence is recorded
at the last day of the year. The tax increase was announced in October 2012 and eventually
took place in March 2013. Clearly, households that were planning to move in the near
future, faced an incentive to bring forward their transaction after the announcement of
the reform. This anticipation effect is a problem for our estimation if the households also
moved before the end of 2012.
Figure A3 reports the monthly transaction volume of co-ops from January 2010 to
December 2017. As the figure shows, the reform was clearly anticipated: the transaction
volume in February 2013 is unusually high. However, there seems to be no anticipation
at the end of 2012. The figure also shows that there is a permanent downward shift in
transaction volume after the tax increase supporting our main findings with respect to
household mobility.
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Figure A3: Number of transactions in co-ops (monthly).
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Notes: Total transaction volume of resale co-op apartments based on monthly data published by Statistics
Finland from Jan 2010 to Dec 2017. The vertical line indicates the timing of the reform.
Based on Figure A3 it seems that anticipation is not a serious concern in our setting.
Nonetheless, in order to check the robustness of our results to these timing issues, we
estimate specifications where we omit years 2012 and 2013. The results are reported in
Table A1 and Table A2. The results are very similar to our main results.
Table A1 and Table A2 also report results using different time windows. The moti-
vation for these estimations is that observations at the beginning of the time period may
not provide as good a point of comparison for the post-reform years as observations closer
to the reform. Therefore, we vary the width of the time window around the reform from
2007–2016 to 2009–2016. Finally, we allow for differential group-specific linear time trends
across the different specifications. Overall, the results seem robust to these changes in
model specification. The point estimates are very close to those reported in Table 3, but
become insignificant in some specifications with the narrower time windows. This is due
to increased imprecision as standard errors roughly double in size, not due to changes in
the size of the treatment effect.
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Table A1: Robustness to time window, donut hole estimation and group-specific time trends
(outcome: Mobility rate).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time window 2006-2016 2007-2016 2008-2016 2009-2016
Panel A: Varying time window
Co-op × After -0.00399∗∗∗ -0.00383∗∗∗ -0.00329∗∗ -0.00388∗∗∗
(0.00105) (0.00112) (0.001000) (0.000856)
Panel B: Varying time window and 2012/2013 dropped
Co-op × After -0.00409∗∗ -0.00387∗∗ -0.00316∗∗ -0.00382∗∗
(0.00131) (0.00141) (0.00120) (0.00110)
Panel C: Varying time window and group-specific trends
Co-op × After -0.00365 -0.00413 -0.00610∗∗ -0.00529∗∗
(0.00202) (0.00228) (0.00171) (0.00178)
Panel D: Varying time window, and group-specific trends and 2012/2013 dropped
Co-op × After -0.00302 -0.00390 -0.00878∗∗ -0.00783∗
(0.00322) (0.00398) (0.00250) (0.00328)
N 22 20 18 16
N (2012 and 2013 dropped) 18 16 14 12
Notes: Table shows DID estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step procedure. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All
the models include household characteristics reported in Table 1 and postcode fixed effects in the first
step and the co-op main effect and year dummies in the second step.
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Table A2: Robustness to time window, donut hole estimation and group-specific time trends
(outcome: Log mobility rate).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time window 2006-2016 2007-2016 2008-2016 2009-2016
Panel A: Varying time window
Co-op × After -0.0562∗∗∗ -0.0528∗∗∗ -0.0471∗∗∗ -0.0541∗∗∗
(0.0124) (0.0126) (0.0115) (0.00949)
Panel B: Varying time window and 2012/2013 dropped
Co-op × After -0.0603∗∗∗ -0.0562∗∗ -0.0486∗∗ -0.0568∗∗∗
(0.0152) (0.0155) (0.0135) (0.0111)
Panel C: Varying time window and group-specific trends
Co-op × After -0.0392 -0.0457 -0.0634∗∗ -0.0477∗
(0.0230) (0.0257) (0.0237) (0.0210)
Panel D: Varying time window, and group-specific trends and 2012/2013 dropped
Co-op × After -0.0308 -0.0430 -0.0877∗ -0.0570
(0.0354) (0.0433) (0.0384) (0.0412)
N 22 20 18 16
N (2012 and 2013 dropped) 18 16 14 12
Notes: Table shows DID estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step procedure. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All
models include household characteristics reported in Table 1 and postcode fixed effects in the first step
and the co-op main effect and year dummies in the second step.
Third, a potential concern is that our results might be driven by sorting of less mobile
households to co-ops after the reform. Such sorting could be analyzed through balancing
tests that use household characteristics as outcome variables in the DID model. Instead
of balancing tests for individual characteristics, we construct an index that relates the
characteristics to the propensity to move. The index is constructed by using pre-reform
data to regress the mobility dummy on all the household characteristics we use as controls,
postcode fixed effects and the co-op dummy. We perform the balancing test for household
and year specific predicted moving propensity from this model (holding postcode and
housing type constant at base level). The results are reported in Figure A4 and Table
A3.
Figure A4 shows that predicted mobility develops almost identically in the treatment
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and the control group before the reform, but starts to gradually diverge after the reform.
This is consistent with less mobile households moving in to co-ops after the reform. How-
ever, the magnitude of the divergence is small relative to our treatment effects in Section
4.
Table A3 reports the estimates of the effect of the reform on sorting. We find a 0.1%-
point or 1% reduction in predicted mobility in co-ops in post-reform years relative to the
control group. The estimates are statistically significant but economically small compared
to the DID estimates for the mobility effects in Table 2 (0.4%-point or 5.6% reduction in
mobility). Note that we control for the household characteristics used in the prediction
model in our baseline DID model. Thus, sorting on these observable characteristics should
not bias our DID estimates. Sorting on unobservable characteristics not adequately prox-
ied by our controls could affect our estimates, but we argue that this is unlikely to be a
major concern in our setting as sorting can occur only gradually through mobility. More-
over, the fact that we find only very small divergence of the mobility indices based on a
rich set of observable characteristics suggests that sorting on unobservables is unlikely to
be an important driver of our results.
Table A4 shows the distribution of destination housing types for different types of
moves and by origin housing type. This information helps to assess potential differences
in the bias in our DID estimates due to spillovers across housing types.
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Figure A4: Sorting on observable household characteristics.
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Notes: Predicted mobility rate is based on a regression of actual mobility on household characteristics
and postcode FEs using pre-reform data. The results are used to calculate moving probabilities for all
households in all years. The prediction is only affected by household characteristics. Postcode is fixed to
reference postcode. Predicted mobility refers to the share of homeowners in each group who are expected
to move between the end of year t–1 and the end of year t. The mobility rates are normalized to one in
2012. Group assignment is based on the homeowners’ housing type in year t–1. The vertical line indicates
the timing of the reform.
Table A3: Sorting on observable household characteristics.
(1) (2)
Predicted mobility Log predicted mobility
Co-op × After -0.000986∗∗∗ -0.00954∗∗
(0.000248) (0.00303)
Pre mean 0.0749
Notes: Table shows DID estimates using the Donald and Lang (2007) two-step procedure. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All
models include the co-op main effect and year dummies in the second step.
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Table A4: Destination housing type for different types of moves.
Type of move Origin housing type Destination housing type
Directly owned Co-op Rent
Move Directly owned 0.361 0.253 0.385
Co-op 0.253 0.434 0.313
Move across provinces Directly owned 0.330 0.238 0.432
Co-op 0.242 0.347 0.411
Move across municipalities Directly owned 0.338 0.264 0.399
Co-op 0.302 0.379 0.319
Move within province Directly owned 0.367 0.256 0.377
Co-op 0.255 0.448 0.297
Move within municipality Directly owned 0.374 0.248 0.377
Co-op 0.224 0.467 0.309
Upsize Directly owned 0.738 0.113 0.149
Co-op 0.395 0.444 0.160
Downsize Directly owned 0.205 0.306 0.489
Co-op 0.087 0.402 0.511
Same size Directly owned 0.317 0.292 0.391
Co-op 0.159 0.452 0.389
One room change Directly owned 0.419 0.253 0.328
Co-op 0.193 0.480 0.327
Two or more rooms change Directly owned 0.332 0.241 0.427
Co-op 0.413 0.354 0.233
Notes: Table shows the distribution of destination housing types of movers for different types of moves
and by origin housing type.
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B Theoretical Analysis
In this appendix, we analyze the effect of the transfer tax on household mobility using a
model with two different types of housing units (houses and co-operatives). In the model,
both housing units exist in two different varieties. One can think of these varieties as
locating in different neighborhoods or cities. We calibrate the model so that it produces
the empirical mobility rates before the reform as well as our DID estimate of the effect of
the reform. The question we wish to address is whether and how much the control group
is affected by the reform.
Model There are two different housing types, co-ops (c) and houses (h). Both housing
types are available in two different locations l = {a, b}.
The stock of housing type (l, t) is denoted by nl,t. The total housing stock in then
na,c + na,h + nb,c + nb,h = 1.
We focus on a symmetric case where na,c = nb,c = nc and na,h = nb,h = nh and
2nc + 2nh = 1.
Initially, each household lives in one housing type. The mass of households living in
each housing type is equal to the stock of that housing type.
All households then draw a monetary valuation for both housing types and locations,
ul,t. After having observed the valuations, each household makes a decision of whether to
move or to stay in the current unit.
Households take prices p = (pa,c, pa,h, pb,c, pb,h) as given. A transaction triggers a
transfer tax liability for the buyer. The tax rate is different for houses and co-ops but the
same in both locations. The after-tax price of housing type (l, t) is (1 + τt) pl,t where τt
is the transfer tax and pl,t is the price received by the seller. All transactions also involve
a fixed non-tax transaction cost ω.
Household problem Consider first the problem of an individual household facing price
vector p and currently living in housing unit (l, t). The household chooses a unit (l′, t′)
to maximize
ul′,t′ + pl,t − pl′,t′ − (τt′pl′,t′ + ω) 1(l′ 6=l or t′ 6=t)
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where ul′,t′ is the value of living in housing type (l
′, t′) and the indicator function
1(l′ 6=l or t′ 6=t) = 1 if the household moves to a new unit and 1(l′ 6=l or t′ 6=t) = 0 if the household
stays in its current unit.
Given preferences, the best alternative for a household living in a housing type (l, t) is
(l∗, t∗) = arg max
l′,t′
{
ul′,t′ + pl,t − pl′,t′ − (τt′pl′,t′ + ω) 1(l′ 6=l or t′ 6=t)
}
. (B1)
If
ul,t ≥ ul′,t′ + pl,t − pl′,t′ − (τt′pl′,t′ + ω) for all l′ 6= l or t′ 6= t (B2)
the household prefers its current house to any other alternative with the given prices.
In order to replicate the empirical mobility rates, we assume that the valuation for
(l′, t′) of a household living in (l, t) is determined by three different components
ul′,t′ = vl′,t′ + κ
l,t
l′,t′ + ε
l,t
l′,t′
where vl′,t′ is a random component drawn from the standard normal distribution. This
component is independent of the current unit. In addition,
uA,F = vA,F + κ
F + εF
uA,H = vA,H
uB,F = vB,F + κ
F
uB,H = vB,H
where
κl,tl′,t′ =

κh if t′ = t = h
κc if t′ = t = c
0 otherwise
and
εl,tl′,t′ =

εh if l′ = l and t′ = t = h
εc if l′ = l and t′ = t = c
0 otherwise
Parameters κh and κc reflect the value households living in housing unit h and c attach
to units of the same type irrespective of location. In the same manner, εh and εc reflect
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the value a household attaches to his current unit relative to all alternatives that require
moving.
The demand for housing type (l′, t′) by a household currently living in (l, t) is
dl,tl′,t′ =
{
1 if l
′
= l∗ and t′ = t∗
0 otherwise
.
Equilibrium With given prices p, the aggregate demand for housing type (l, t) is
Dl,t = D
a,c
l,t +D
a,h
l,t +D
b,c
l,t +D
b,h
l,t ,
where Da,cl,t is the demand for housing type (l, t) by all households living in housing
type (c, a). That is, the aggregate demand for housing type (l, t) equals the demand by
all households living in different housing types (including those living currently in house
(l, t) and not moving).
In equilibrium, all households choose the house that maximizes their utility according
to equation (B1) taking house prices as given and
Dl,t = nl,t
that is, the demand for housing type (l, t) equals the stock of housing type (l, t).
Solving the model Because of the symmetry in the model, houses and co-ops in the two
locations will have the same equilibrium price. Therefore, in equilibrium, pa,c = pb,c = pc
and pa,h = pb,h = ph.
The price of houses, ph, is pinned down by the size of the transaction costs relative
to the valuation shocks drawn from the standard normal distribution. If house prices are
very low, the transaction costs are small relative to the valuation differences generated by
the standard normal distribution. Therefore, ph must be set such that the transactions
costs are reasonable relative to the benefits of moving.10
We discretize the model by assuming that there are 1, 000, 000 households living in
each housing type. We then draw valuations vl′,t′ for each household, use equation (B1)
to determine excess demand for both housing types with given co-op price pc, and solve
for a pc which minimizes the excess demands.
10This is because the model features only housing consumption and no other consumption. As a result,
the price level as such does not reflect the cost of housing.
35
Calibration We calibrate the model so that it produces the same difference-in-difference
effect we found where households living in a co-op are the treatment group and households
living in a house are the control group.
Before the reform, the transfer tax rates were τh = 4% and τc = 1.5%.
11
The mobility rates of households living in houses and co-ops in our data before the
reform are reported in Table B1. Those moving to rental housing have been excluded
from the figures reported in the table.
Table B1: Mobility rates in the data in 2012.
Move to
House Co-op
House 1.4 1.1
Co-op 2.0 3.4
In 2012, roughly 54% of all housing units in our data were houses and 46% co-ops.
However, using these housing stocks together with the mobility rates in Table B1 would
imply that, in absolute numbers, more households are moving from co-ops to houses than
vice versa. As a result, we would not be able to replicate the empirical mobility rates in
the model.
Therefore, we set the relative sizes of the different types of housing stocks so that
absolute levels of mobility from different types of houses are equal. This requires assuming
that the share of houses in the model is 66.7% and the share of co-ops is 33.3%.
The preference parameters (εh, εc, κh, and κc), the pre-reform house price, ph, and the
non-tax transaction cost parameter, ω, are chosen such that, given equilibrium prices, the
model replicates the following targets:
1) The mobility rates in Table B1.
2) The empirical estimate of the mobility effect of the reform, 5.6%.
3) The non-tax transaction cost is 3% of the equilibrium house price before the reform.
The calibrated preference parameter values are εh = 2.3333, εc = 2.0444, κh = 0.3667,
and κc = 0.7222. In addition, ph = 10.5333 and ω = 0.3160. The equilibrium price of
co-ops is pc = 10.8852.
11The tax rate on co-ops is the effective tax rate on the overall value of the co-op, that is, taking into
account the housing company loan associated with the unit.
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Results Figure B1 shows the mobility rates in the model in different sub-groups for
six different tax regimes where the tax rate on co-ops increases from 1.5% up to 4.0%
and the tax rate on houses is always 4.0%. The left panel shows the mobility rate in the
treatment group homeowners living in co-ops) and control group (homeowners living in
houses). The right panel in turn divides the two groups into two sub-groups according
to the destination of the moves. The solid lines show the mobility rate from one housing
type to the same type while the dashed lines show the mobility rate from one housing
type to the other type.
Figure B1: Mobility rates in treatment and control groups (left panel) and by destination
housing type (right panel).
The left panel shows that changing the tax rate on co-ops also effects mobility rate
in among those homeowners living in houses (our control group). When the tax rate on
co-ops is increased from 1.5% to 2%, the mobility rate of those living in houses is reduced
from 2.47% to 2.44% or by some 1.4%. At the same time, the mobility rate those living
in co-ops (our treatment group) is reduced from 5.47% to 5.09% or by some 7.0%.
The right panel of the figure shows the reduced mobility among those living in houses
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is driven by reduction in cross-moving. Moves from houses to co-ops are slightly hindered
by a higher tax rate on co-ops while moves from houses to houses are not affected at all.
The reason is the link between the two market segments: if those living in co-ops are less
willing to move, those living in houses have fewer opportunities to move to a co-op.
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C Welfare
When the transfer tax is increased, some moves that would have taken place in the absence
of the increase are no longer mutually beneficial for the buyer and the seller. The welfare
cost of the tax increase is the overall utility loss related to these foregone moves.
The size of the welfare cost can be illustrated by calculating the marginal cost of
public funds (MCF), which relates the welfare loss of a tax increase to the additional tax
revenue raised. For a non-distortionary tax, one tax-euro collected from the private sector
is worth exactly one euro for the private sector and the MCF is equal to one. The larger
the welfare cost related to the tax, the larger the MCF.
The MCF can be approximated by
MCF =
W (t0)−W (t1) +R(t1)−R(t0)
R(t1)−R(t0) =
∆W (t) + ∆R(t)
∆R(t)
(C1)
where ∆W refers to the welfare loss resulting from increasing the tax rate from t0 to
t1 and ∆R is the additional tax revenue.
The additional tax revenue raised can be expressed as
∆R(t) = t1 × p× (1− γ)×m− t0 × p×m (C2)
where p is the average price (transaction price including any co-op loan) and m is
the number of moves prior to the tax increase. Parameter γ is the percentage change in
mobility when the tax rate is raised from t0 to t1.
In our transaction data, after 2013 the average loan-to-value-ratio for co-op resales
was roughly 5%. This means that the average effective tax rate on the transaction price
including any co-op loan was 1.52% before the reform and 2% after the reform. Hence, in
our MCF calculations we set t0 = 0.0152 and t1 = 0.02.
We cannot directly observe the welfare loss related to the foregone moves. However,
we can conjecture that before the tax increase, trades involving housing units in co-ops
with a welfare gain smaller than 1.52% of the price (i.e. transaction price including any
co-op loan) did not take place. In the same way, we know that the welfare loss related to
the foregone moves cannot exceed 2% of the price after the tax increase. Therefore the
welfare loss related to a foregone move is somewhere between 1.52% and 2% of the price.
Thus, MCF lies within the interval
MCF =
{
γ × t0 + t1 × (1− γ)− t0
t1 × (1− γ)− t0 ,
γ × t1 + t1 × (1− γ)− t0
t1 × (1− γ)− t0
}
(C3)
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Finally, based on our results on mobility, we set γ = 0.07. This figure takes into account
that the DID estimate is downward biased because the reform also reduced mobility in
the control group.
Plugging the tax rates and the estimated effect on the mobility rate into the above
formulas gives a range of MCF values from 1.31 to 1.41.
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